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Abstract
There has been abundant research on the relationships between different
actors in an innovation system, particularly when cultural differences and
divergent organisational practices pose a barrier to collaboration and
knowledge exchange among different actors. In this paper we focus on
situations in which actors lack awareness of what themselves and other
relevant actors in the system can offer or require. To respond to this situation,
policy practitioners in different contexts have devised remarkably similar
responses to the problem of developing linkages when actors in the system 
do not perceive a need for these to exist. We have developed the concept of
“interface structures” to refer to this type of organisations. The paper
discusses this notion, relates it to similar concepts in the literature, and
concludes that they constitute a different type of organisational approach.
They aim to generate changes in the attitudes and expectations of actors, and
when successful they will lead to the formation of Triple Helix linkages.
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1. Background: defining and characterising interface structures
The “Triple Helix” model has drawn attention to the patterns of linkages that
emerge among different institutional sectors (public sector, private industry,
academia). Given the dynamic and evolutionary features that the model
emphasizes, Triple Helix linkages have often been studied from a systems
perspective (Carlsson, 2002; Carayol, 2003). Innovation systems approaches
focus the attention on the existence of situations where the relationships
between different actors in the system are weak, and where divergent cultural
traits and organisational practices pose a barrier to the collaboration and
coordination among them. There has been abundant research about the study 
of these relationships, especially in areas like university-industry linkages
where, it has often been argued, cultural differences and other barriers have
hampered a fluid relationship (Agrawal, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carayol,
2003). A large literature has developed on the setting up of “intermediate”
organisations (Howells, 2006).
This literature usually takes as its subject the problems emerging in countries
where there is an advanced research and industrial infrastructure, and where
potential technology customers are assumed to be able to articulate a
demand that could then be serviced by public research organisations. Here 
cultural differences, managerial capacities, divergent interests, all pose
barriers to knowledge transfer, but there is an assumption that, in the absence
of these barriers, potential technology customers would be able to articulate a
demand that could then be serviced by universities and other public research
organisations. If some difficulties are overcome and enough information is 
available then relationships will develop. Yet, in some cases the actors may
lack the competence to establish collaborations, either because they cannot
articulate their own demand or do not have the necessary research
capabilities to offer solutions to existing problems. The concept of “bridging
organisation” refers to organisations seeking to establish and maintain 
interactions among system actors while at the same time compensating for 
weaknesses including lack of buyer competence, lack of supplier
technological capacity, and inadequate research capabilities within the 
research system, among others. (Carlsson 1994,14, 16). Bridging
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organisations have therefore a broader remit than technology
commercialisation and traditional technology transfer organisations.
While Carlsson focus on the bridging organisation and its role within and
innovation systems, others have focused on the bridging function. Bessant
and Rush (1995) analyse the bridging role of consultants in technology
transfer and identify their roles as including the identifications and articulation
of user needs, training, education information and communication, the location
of key sources of knowledge, and the establishment of links with the external
knowledge system, among many others. The bridging function of consultants
is therefore multifaceted. Bessant and Rush argue that “the diversity of the
consultant role and the flexibility in modes of operation and interaction mean
that there is considerable scope for consultants to act as key bridging
intermediaries across a wide range of users” (Bessant and Rush 1995,101).
They focus on the variety of roles that such individual consultants can play in
technology transfer.
This research has focused on characterising the intermediation role and
analysing its location within and innovation system. More recently interest has
started to focus on the organisational practices that make bridging
organisations effective. Sapsed, Grantham and DeFillippi (2006) address the
role of bridging organisations connecting entrepreneurs in emerging
industries. They argue that the “key effect of brokerage is the extension of a
firm or entrepreneur’s network, such that ideas and information can be taken
from one context into another”, and that in this process “there is more
occurring than simply introductions between unfamiliar parties”. By analysing
a specific case of small entrepreneurs in the computer gaming industry they
endeavour to contribute to the theoretical development on the distinctive role
of bridging organisations within an innovation system, and how these can be
structured and co-ordinated to be effective. This paper follows in the same
direction adopting an entirely different empirical focus.
We are interested in situations where actors lack awareness of what the
system can offer or even of their own needs. In other words, we address parts
of the system in which the actors “don´t know what they don´t know”. Yet, this
problem does not occur because of the novelty of the areas of activity, or of 
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their recent entrepreneurial nature, but rather because of more deeply
entrenched cultural and institutional barriers. We do not focus on small
entrepreneurial groups operating in emergent markets, but on large
organisations operating in long-standing markets or performing long-
established functions.
We show how, to respond to this situation, policy practitioners in different
contexts have devised remarkably similar responses, which have an
organisational rather than a purely instrumental nature. They have developed
what we have defined elsewhere as “interface structures” (Fernández de
Lucio et al., 1996). This paper develops this notion. Unlike Sapsed, Grantham
and DeFillippi (206) we are not focusing on operational practices but on 
organisational responses and their structural context. We will focus on the
characteristics on “interface structures” rather than on their management and
day-to-day practices.
Based on case studies of two different experiences we define the concept of 
“interface structure”, identify its role and characteristics (networked structure,
broad portfolio of activities,…), and their role supporting the relationships
among different system actors. The paper presents the case studies of a 
network of University-Industry technology transfer organisations set up in
Spain in the late 1980s (OTRI Network), and an organisation set up in the
United Kingdom to improve the relationship between government defence
research establishments and their socio-economic environment (the Defence
Diversification Agency). After the case studies we draw some common traits
that bring together these initiatives originating in such different contexts, and
based on these traits we develop the concept of Interface Structure. We
conclude by placing this context within a systemic view of innovation.
2. The OTRI Network and University-Industry technology transfer in
Spain
2.1. Background
During the mid 1980s the Spanish innovation system was being rapidly
transformed. Spain was emerging from almost 40 years of military dictatorship
(a new democratic Constitution was approved in 1978) with a model of 
Proc. of Triple Helix VI: 6th Intl. Conf. on University, Industry & Government Linkages
5
economic development that has sometimes been described as “dependent”:
research was virtually non-existent, and the little that was done was often
carried out in large government research organisations with weak linkages to 
their socio-economic environment. In the mid 1980s a whole set of legal
initiatives was enacted attempting to develop new research and innovation
capacities (University Reform Act –1983-, Act for the Promotion and
Coordination of Scientific and Technical Research, usually referred to as the 
“Science Act –1986-, and a new Patent Act –1986). Linked to them the First
National R&D plan was launched in 1988. Until then, Universities had carried
out very little research, typically funded through their own resources. Also,
until the University Reform Act, it was illegal for Universities to obtain
resources additional to their normal budgets by entering, for instance, into
contractual agreements with firms and other organisations. The only linkage
between Universities and firms was organised through 4 “University-
Enterprise Foundations” that had been created during the 70s and early 80s,
to manage the contracts that research groups from a few universities might
have obtained through their own initiative.
The situation in the government research establishments had been marginally
better. The Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), the main research
establishment in the country, had several applied research institutes with a 
tradition of collaboration with industry, although paradoxically, this had
weakened substantially since the 1950s (López García, 1999). In the mid 
1980s CSIC launched several initiatives to promote collaboration with 
industry, like the creation of a technology transfer office (1985), and the 
launch of collaboration programmes (PECOS) (Fernández de Lucio, 1988).
On the demand side, the Spanish development model had been based on
cheap labour and energy costs, foreign investment and foreign technology
(García Delgado, 1995). During the 1960s and 1970s Spanish firms carried
out virtually no R&D: in 1964 Spanish firms spent 0.03% of GDP in R&D. By
1984 this percentage had grown to a paltry 0.18%. The lack of formal
research activities was accompanied by the low educational level of Spanish
industrial labour force: by 1984 only 2% of industrial employees had a
university degree (Más et al., 2004).
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Within this context, policy-makers were aware of the need to support the 
collaboration between public research organisations and industry. The
managers of the National Research Plan were asked to support a relationship
that had been, until then, non-existent. Rather than supporting University-
Industry collaboration, science policy managers were placed in the difficult job
of creating it.
2.2. The OTRI Network: genesis and main characteristics
The creation of technology transfer offices in Spanish universities was a “top-
down” policy initiative. In 1989 the managers of the National R&D Plan,
included among their activities the setting up of Offices for the Transfer of 
Research Results (OTRIs) in all Spanish universities. The OTRI´s were
originally designed with, among others, the following objectives (CICYT 1988):
?? To identify capacities and results with potential non-academic
applications generated by research groups
?? To facilitate the transfer of research results from the research groups
to industry and other users
?? To support researchers when entering contractual negotiations with 
firms and other clients and help them manage research contracts and
to help  them protect their Intellectual Property with the appropriate
legal tools
?? To provide researchers with information on opportunities available
through European programmes and help them develop research
projects
These were all areas in which Spanish universities and research centres had
little if any experience. The OTRIs´ main goal was to facilitate University-
Industry collaboration, but they had a broad set of objectives. For instance the
managers of the Spanish National R&D Plan used the OTRIs as conveyors of 
information to the academic community, and relied on them to disseminate
information and support the access to the different policy instruments in
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support of University-Industry relations that they would develop and
implement over the years.
Importantly, the OTRIs were set up as a network co-ordinated and supported
by a central unit (the Office of Technology Transfer –OTT) within the National
Plan Secretariat (Castro et al., 1991; Fernández de Lucio et al., 1996).1 The
role of this central co-ordination was paramount. The OTRIs themselves were
very small units, intended to be close to their local research capacities (mainly
in the universities) and local needs. Yet, for this same reason, they lacked,
specialised capacities and, importantly, experience. The central OTT
coordinated activities, facilitated the exchange of information and experiences,
and provided, among other services, management training in areas like
Intellectual Property, and the dissemination of information on research
opportunities.
As the OTRIs themselves gained capacity and experience, the central support
role of the OTT diminished in importance and the Office was formally closed in
the late 1990s. However, the OTRIs continued to work as a network. In 1997
the Vice-Chancellors of all Spanish universities formally created the OTRI
Network, which continues to organise training, establish working groups, and
develop other activities typically oriented towards training and the
dissemination of good practice.
All Spanish Universities and the Spanish Council for Scientific Research
(CSIC) joined the initiative and set up their OTRIs. Similarly, all newly created
universities have, since their establishment, set up OTRIs affiliated to the
network. The outcome of this process was the establishment of a
geographically distributed network of small units, displaying close links with
and detailed knowledge of their local environments.2
The emergence of a network of small units was not an accident, but was
designed into the policy initiative. An OTRI would have two or three
employees, which would operate as generalists without a clear definition of
1
 The arrangement was called OTRI Network/OTT.
2
 Our previous research has shown how, in fact, all OTRIs have established collaborative
links with firms from their specific regions (Castro et all., 2005).
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their functions, supported by an administrative post. Their main role was to 
stimulate the relationships between industry and academia, on the one hand
encouraging academic researchers to get involved in work with industrial
partners by offering information and personalised support, while, on the other
hand, providing information to the industrial community about the capabilities
available in academic research centres and universities. In this way, the OTRI
played the role of a facilitator, rather than that of a technology broker, trying to
support the creation of a market for research services and outputs where
none existed. Spanish academics had developed an inward-looking culture,
oriented towards teaching, less concerned by research, and without any
interest in technology transfer activities. Within this context, the OTRI had to
operate as a client-oriented service, avoiding the bureaucratic and legalistic
approaches that are still today characteristic of universities and research
establishments’ administrations.
Given the distributed nature of the OTRI network, not all OTRIs developed
following exactly the same model. Some developed more rapidly, particularly
those situated within universities with applied research capacities, and where
groups of lecturers became rapidly involved and increasingly experienced in
establishing contractual relationships with the private sector. Often, OTRIs
had to take over managerial functions for which they had not been originally 
intended, as the central university services proved unable to administer
research contracts and programs. In these cases the OTRIs became
overwhelmed with administrative tasks and found it difficult to engage in the
functions for which they had been originally intended.
2.3. Outcomes
Whatever the difficulties experienced by specific OTRIs, there can be little
doubt that they play an important role in the major change that Spanish
universities were to experience in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For
instance, according to OECD data, the share of universities’ R&D funded by
firms grew from 0.4% in 1981 to 8% in 2002, superior to the OECD average
(OECD, 2004). This might be attributed to causes other than the emergence
of these offices; yet the table below shows how several indicators of OTRI 
activity and outcomes have grown rapidly, suggesting an important role in 
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drawing public research funds to universities. Even when the main goal of the
offices was not the generation of research contracts but to establish links and
generate mutual interest between two hitherto separated communities, they 
managed an increasingly large number of contracts generating substantial
resources.
Table 1 University OTRIs: activity and output indicators
1989 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of universities 32 48 57 57 58 58 60
Professional staff (FTE) 64 154 179 234 294 348 434
Number of R&D contracts 695 3.270 8.687 8.323 7.958 9.830 10.088
Income from R&D contracts (M€) 8 120 218 252 258 282 339
Number of national patent applications 24 140 264 301 317 307 336
Number of international patent extensions 43 66 107 93 117
Number of options and license contracts 50 53 78 143 106
Income from licenses (M€) 0,49 1,14 1,69 1,9 1,7
New spin offs created 39 65 87 90 88
Sources: Own elaboration of CICYT annual reports (1989 and 1995) and University’s OTRI Network
annual surveys (2001-2005)
The amount and value of R&D contracts managed have recently stabilised
after a protracted period of rapid growth, reflecting probably that the 
community of university researchers that were receptive to the OTRIs
“message” and capable of engaging in contractual research relationships with
external partners has been reached in its totality, and that the growth
generated by the creation of new universities and the hiring of young
academics has stopped. Recently the OTRIs have been involved in
supporting new transfer tools like the creation of spin-off firms in science-
based sectors. This is a new avenue likely to require further cultural and legal
changes.
3. The UK Defence Diversification Agency
3.1 Background: commercialisation and the government defence labs
The creation of the UK Defence Diversification Agency (DDA) is linked to the
process of commercialisation in UK defence research establishments, which
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is, in turn, part of a series of reforms in government research establishments
implemented mainly during the 1980s and 1990s. Policy measures seeking to 
obtain more “value-for-money” from government research investments
introduced greater accountability and a growing commercialisation of the
relationship with Government users. In the defence area, most of the 
previously independent establishment were progressively merged into the 
Defence Research Agency (1991) and the Defence Evaluation and Research
Agency –DERA- (1995), which committed to seek maximum wealth creation
from its research activities. As executive agencies of the Ministry of Defence
(MoD), these organisations gained the flexibility to become more commercial
in their operations resulting in significant growth in DERA’s external income
and the development of a more entrepreneurial culture among its scientific
and technical staff (Arthur D. Little 2000). 3 Later most of DERA was turn into
a new firm (QinetiQ) which is now being floated in the stock market.
The creation of the DDA is related to this process. The Labour Party
administration set up the DDA to address three priorities:
?? To encourage the widest possible exploitation of military technology by
civilian firms 
?? To encourage a growing variety of defence suppliers
?? To encourage the transfer of suitable civil technology into military
programmes.
To these ends the DDA was tasked with encouraging access to government
defence labs, providing information about the capabilities they had available,
stimulating transfer of MoD’s Intellectual Property Rights, seeking partnership
with companies for programmes of co-development and adaptation, and
providing information about future equipment needs and technological trends
to potential new suppliers. Therefore, the objectives laid out for the DDA 
considered the transfer of technology from military to civilian applications, and
vice versa. Initially, the model implicit in the description of DDAs tasks was
linear: potential technology users in the civilian industry would be made aware
3
 Yet, DERA’s main function remained to support the needs of the Ministry of Defence.
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of the technology offerings from DERA, or of opportunities in the defence
markets. The possibility of more interactive collaboration through the
engagement in programmes of co-development and technology adaptation
was mentioned but it did not feature prominently; instead there was a focus on
providing information through, for instance, databases of technological
capabilities to which it was expected civilian firms would respond. The 
proposal could be seen as a continuation of other attempts at organising and
stimulating technology transfer from the defence research establishments that 
had been tried with little success during the 1980s and early 1990s.4 As we
will see below the model that was eventually implemented diverted from this
initial sketch.
3.2 Implementation: The DDA
The Defence Diversification Agency (DDA) was established in 1998 and
began its first year of operation with a budget of £2 million. During its first year
of operation the DDA created of a network of support activities and personnel
across the country. It was set up with a small centre and, initially, five regional
offices. With an original remit of promoting technology spill-overs between the 
defence and civilian sectors, the challenge facing the fledgling organisation
was to establish mechanisms able to deal with a large variety of technological
fields and industrial sectors. The defence research establishments had
developed technological capabilities across a broad range of generic
technologies with potential applications in many sectors, and the range of
civilian technologies applicable to defence systems were not limited to any 
specific sector. Unlike other technology transfer organisations, which typically 
focused on a relatively narrow range of technologies and sectors, the DDA 
had to develop activities covering virtually all technological sectors.
Further there was no tradition among civilian firms of access to defence
research capacities. The latter had developed in a closed environment, and
there was a widespread belief outside defence circles, that their activities
4
 For instance, for the failed experience in the late 1980s with the creation of an independent
technology broker to commercialise defence technology (Defence Technology Enterprises)
see Spinardi (1992). A detailed analysis of another, more successful experience with more
sophisticated models of technology transfer see Molas-Gallart and Sinclair (1999) analysis of
the Dual-Use Technology Centres.
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were very specialised and irrelevant to civilian needs. Further, the highly 
publicised and recurrent scandals in the industry involving time and cost 
overruns, and dubious export practices involving the payment of bribes and
other “sweeteners” to potential customers, had built an image of the defence
industries as inefficient and stuck to outmoded managerial practices.
This situation created substantial challenges. First, there was not a market 
“out there” waiting to access the capacities that the defence labs had to offer;
on the contrary a customer base had to be built virtually from scratch. To do
so, the DDA established a network of regional representatives (Technology
Diversification Managers –TDM) working in close collaboration with the local
“Regional Development Authorities”,5 and other local organisations including
the government-funded “Business Links”. By 2004 the DDA was working from
26 different locations, each with at least one “Technology Diversification
Manager” (TDM). The TDM’s objective was to be close to the local needs and
to establish links with firms and organisations that could, in principle, be
interested in working with the defence labs or for the defence agencies.
The second problem was how to identify potential partners operating in
different sectors with very limited availability of resources. Often, the 
technological requirements of a firm would not have been articulated; how can
one then identify possible fields for technological co-operation when we do not
know what a potential partner would need? To address this problem, the DDA 
developed a portfolio of tools to carry out technology audits of firms, and
identify possible technology requirements. The TDMs apply these tools free of
charge to selected firms. The Regional Development Authorities and the
TDMs identify firms that, for their characteristics, may benefit from the
technology offerings available at the defence labs, and offer them a 
technology audit for free. If firms want to pursue the opportunities identified
through the audit the DDA will facilitate contacts and a further exploratory
analysis with scientists and technicians from the defence research
establishments. The DDA will usually step aside from the process once these
5 The Regional Development Authorities are government-funded agencies whose main task is
the promotion of regional economic development.
Proc. of Triple Helix VI: 6th Intl. Conf. on University, Industry & Government Linkages
13
contact have been established and the future partners start moving towards
the signature of contractual agreements.
The main DDA stakeholder, the UK Ministry of Defence soon focused its
attention on another of the DDA’s original objectives: the identification of 
civilian technologies of interest to military applications. Driven by the growing
importance of civilian-led IT for military applications, the problem here is not
only how to find relevant technological capabilities among civilian suppliers,
but how to insert them in time into new weapons systems. The distributed
network of TDMs has also helped in the identification of local capabilities that
could be of interest to defence production.
3.3 Outcomes
Since its creation the DDA has grown to reach a total staff of 60, distributed
between the central offices and a regional network of 26 TDMs. It has
generated a large number of collaborations between firms and the defence
research laboratories, and has introduced many commercial firms to defence
markets. Since its establishment the DDA has advised technology transfer
contracts with a direct value of £17 million. In 2004, for instance, it placed 18 
contracts between firms that had so far focused on civilian markets and the 
Ministry of Defence, and helped brokering 104 technology transfer contracts.
Yet, it would be misleading to assess the outcomes of DDA’s work by using
the type of indicators that have been applied to traditional technology brokers.
Brokering technology transfer deals is not the focus of DDA’s activity. The
flexible approach to the identification of technological opportunities
implemented by the DDA has led to a broad variety of initiatives including, 
among others:
o Technology and knowledge brokering - Matching the technological
needs of commercial firms with the capabilities existing at the defence
research laboratories). At times this will result in the licensing of 
specific technologies, but, more often, the defence research
establishments will provide technology services, mainly the testing and
evaluation of new technologies and products. This activity revolves
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around the implementation of technology audits in SMEs. Currently the 
DDA carries out about 160 audits each year.
o Marketing assistance - Identifying potential new suppliers of advanced
technologies to the UK Ministry of Defence.
o Regeneration activities. The DDA has, for instance, contributed to the
development of an under-used military airfield into a specialist test and
evaluation centre for both military and civilian Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles.
o Managing incubators. The Farnborough Entreprise Hub and the
London Business Innovation Centre are two examples of incubators
managed by the DDA and supported by a group of regional and local
authorities
o Dissemination - Participating in and organising events to present
networking opportunities, introduce the procurement needs and
practices of the MoD, discuss financing mechanisms for new
companies and products, and explain Intellectual Property protection
and evaluation practices. These activities are typically oriented to
SMEs.
o Development and implementation of knowledge and technology
management tools. In addition to its own technology audit
methodology, the DDA is developing, together with a British SME, a
software tool to quantify the effect of technology and knowledge
transfer.
o Project evaluation. The DDA has helped the Welsh Knowledge
Exploitation Fund develop a process for the evaluation of research
proposals, identifying scientists from defence laboratories able to 
provide technical and scientific appraisals of the proposals.
This is a broad set of activities spreading over a broad variety of industrial
sectors, technologies, and regions. Examples of technologies that, having
been first developed for a military use, have been developed into civilian
applications with the help of the DDA cover virtually all industrial sectors,
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including electronics, health, renewable energies, transport, industrial
coatings, monitoring services, etc. 
4. Analysis: towards “Interface Structures”
Although they emerge from very different contexts and address different
communities, the OTRI Network and the DDA experience share interesting
commonalities. In both cases the problem they faced was to create a
relationship between actors that did not have a tradition of collaboration, yet 
they dealt, at least at one end of the relationship, with large organisations with 
well-defined cultures. In Spain, there had hardly been any relationship
between universities and industry prior to the creation of the OTRI Network. In
the UK, civilian firms, particularly SMEs had no experience of collaborating
with defence research laboratories. In both cases, the parties were unaware
of each others’ capabilities and needs, and no “market” for technology or
technology services existed. Under these circumstances traditional a 
concentration on technology commercialisation strategies will not be
adequate.
What is remarkable about the experience of the OTRI Network and the DDA is 
that without any previous knowledge of each other they developed a similar
approach, which translates into a different kind of organisation we call 
“Interface Structures”. We use this term to refer to organisations set up by one
or more agents to promote and facilitate relationships in all matters related to 
innovation between different actors of an innovation system (Fernández de
Lucio et al. 1996). The objective of an interface structure is to act as a
promoter and catalyst of the relationships between different actors in the
system, addressing the problems that have impeded the establishment of 
long-term linkages, but without becoming directly involved in the innovation
process itself. In addition to a traditional brokering role (setting up connections
across communities), interface structures “stimulate” otherwise passive actors 
to use these connections actively.
Interface structures like the ones analysed in this paper have undertaken
much broader roles than those typically attributed to the much studied
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technology transfer organisations. Interface Structures have a set of
distinctive and common characteristics:
?? “Catalyst role” In chemistry a catalyst helps two other elements to 
interact in a chemical reaction, which would not occur in the absence of 
the catalyst. The catalyst however does not participate in the reaction,
a good catalyst is the one that does not spend itself in it. This is a good
analogy with the role of the “interface structures” we are analysing
here.6 Their role is to put in touch two actors that would not otherwise
interact, even if they were put in contact, and assist them to reach
agreements that will take the relationship further. Interface structures
inject a new “dynamic” into the innovation system, making its actors
increasingly aware of opportunities in other parts of the system, and
more active through the establishment of new relationships, without the
interface structure itself getting directly involved in these new relations.
The OTRIs may participate in licensing and other contractual
agreements, but only as a further service they offer to their “customers”
in universities and research establishments. Their strategy can be
considered “mixed”, having both commercialisation and catalyst roles,
but with the latter usually dominating. The DDA case is even clearer in 
this respect: it does not get involved in technology commercialisation
activities: its practice is to step aside once two groups start “talking
business”. In this respect, it cannot be more different from a typical
commercially-oriented technology broker, which derives its income and
main “raison d’etre” from licensing deals and other commercialisation
practices.
6
 The term “catalytic” has also been used to refer to a market-friendly approach to the
development of technology policies (Teubal, 1997). For Teubal technology policies oriented to
the “functional promotion of socially desirable technological activities” (Teubal 1997,1165)
need, among other requirements, to stimulate firm-based learning, diffuse new routines within
the firms, reduce transactions costs, integrate the national production/innovation system, and
build markets in connection with socially desirable technologies (Teubal 1997,1168). Our
approach is consistent with Teubal’s proposals, but instead of using the term “catalytic” to
describe a broad set of policy goals as Teubal does, we employ it to define the operational
objectives guiding the development of a specific set of organisational structures within an 
innovation system.
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?? Customer-led. Interface structures are not clearing houses for
technologies and capabilities developed in research organisations; in
other words their role is not to push technologies developed by
scientific establishment to new sectors and customers. Instead, one of 
the problems they face is that neither the communities with which
researchers could establish mutually profitable links have developed
and articulated their demand for technology, nor the scientists and
technicians are aware of what could they offer to potential commercial
customers. The orientation of the interface structure is therefore
customer-led: helping companies define and convey their technological
needs, and helping researchers understand better how their
capabilities can be used outside their normal practice environment (in 
our cases academic or defence). The DDA, for instance, stimulates
technological demand through the use of formal analytical tools (their
technology audits). The OTRI Networks has focused on “educating”
researchers on management and commercial practices necessary to
be able to operate outside the academic environment.
?? Decentralised and networked. To be able to provide the networking
opportunities and act as a catalyst, Interface Structures need to be
close to their potential clients and, therefore, have to establish a
network of geographically dispersed operations. Both the OTRI
Network and the DDA have offices all over the national geography, and
have a system to network their operations. Network is necessary
because of the small size of the local offices (a few individuals at most, 
sometimes only one person).
?? Individualised approach and “know-who” capacities. To be able to 
establish and strengthen networks at the local and regional level
Interface Structures have to emphasise personal contacts, and be able
to respond to the individual demands of specific researchers and
potential users and beneficiaries of their technological capabilities. For
instance, while one of the DDA failed predecessors, Defence
Technologies Enterprises Ltd., built a database of technologies on
offer, the DDA is building a database of thousands of contacts in 
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industry and academia, seeing its growing network of contacts as one
of its main assets. In Spain, although the OTRI Network/OTT did not
build a centralised contact database, yet it focused a substantial part of
its activity in providing point of contacts to both industrialists and
researchers. In practice both organisations develop a “know-who”
expertise (OECD 1996) as a crucial capacity to support their daily
activities.
?? Generalist rather than specialised. Traditional technology brokers that 
operate as commercial intermediaries and seek to generate funds from
the licensing of technologies and other commercial activities are
typically targeted in their operations and the set of skills they have to 
deploy, often focusing in a few technological areas. In contrast,
Interface Structures have a broader set of goals and activities, will have
to rely on generalists who are able to generate new personal networks,
and will not focus on narrow disciplinary or technological
specialisations. The networked and customer-led characteristics of 
Interface Structures causes them to be involved in a variety of transfer
and collaborative mechanisms, and of sectors of application and
technology fields. These call for a flexible technological and sectoral
coverage to be able to adapt to the needs of the client base, requiring
their local representatives to be generalists able to network within and
across different communities (“know-who”), rather than technical or 
functional specialists. Functional expertise (for instance on legal or
financial matters) will be provided through the central services (DDA), 
or through the networking activities (OTRI Network).
5. Conclusions
As we have seen in this paper, Interface Structures can emerge in very
different contexts, but respond to a similar problem: the need to bridge
different communities and institutions with different cultures and practices, and
which are both unable to articulate their technological needs or offerings, and
unaware of the capabilities or needs the other have. From this perspective the 
concept of Interface Structure can be integrated into a “systems of innovation”
framework: they facilitate, promote and stimulate linkages among the
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components of an innovation system. There are relevant in situations in which 
the relationships between elements of the innovation system are not occurring
spontaneously or fluidly (Polt et al, 2001); that is, in systems that lack
“articulation” (Fernández de Lucio et al., 2003).
The concept can also be integrated within a Triple Helix model. Here the
“focus is on the network overlay of communications and expectations that
reshape the institutional arrangements among universities, industries and
government agencies” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000,109). Interface
structures operate where such communications take place and affect the way
in which expectations and relationships are formed.
The roles of an Interface Structure are complex and go far beyond the
development of an organisation to operate as a conveyor belt for 
technologies. Its position within a dynamic system will, however, tend to be
weak. Without a clear commercial orientation Interface Structures require the 
support of other organisations, which in the cases we have analysed are
always located within the public sector. The DDA depended on the budgetary
support of the Ministry of Defence and relies on the assistance of Regional
Development Authorities. The OTRI Network was initially funded by central
government (through the Spanish National R&D Plan) and regional
authorities. Within this context both organisations can be easily affected by
policy changes. Pressures to become, for instance, more commercial in their
strategies and day to day practices would completely change their nature,
affecting most if not all of the characteristics we have identified in this paper.
Here too, both sets of organisations analysed in this paper appear to be
following a similar developmental path. The OTRIs have been pushed to 
diversify their sources of income by increasingly focusing on project-based
funding. The UK Ministry of Defence will withdraw its DDA funding, pushing
the agency towards a commercial structure.
These pressures and changes were predictable, particularly as the impacts of 
Interface Structures are often difficult to translate into easy to interpret
quantitative indicators and may appear to be vague to policy-makers. How
does one for instance translate the “strengthening of the linkages in an
innovation system” into a clear measure of policy impact on social and
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economic welfare? This difficulty to present the rationale for Interface
Structures through “hard” impact data and using concepts that do not “hang”
on complex theoretical frameworks (innovation systems, triple helix) possibly
constitutes their main weakness today as a policy instrument and explains
that their diffusion remains limited.
Another challenge faced by Interface Structures stems from the dynamic
nature of the context within which they operate. As their “client” organisations
learn about each other’s capabilities, become more dynamic, and learn how to
establish links and collaborate with each other, their initial role may start to
become obsolete. Becoming victim of their own success is a distinct
possibility, and may generate internal pressures to develop new roles and
objectives.
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